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The use of taxes as a Regulatory instrument in environmental economics is a
classic topic. In a nutshell, the need for regulation usually arises because
producing causes detrimental emissions. Due to the lack of a proper market, the
firms do not internalize the impact of these emissions on the utility of other
agents. Thus, they take their decisions on the basis of prices that do not reflect
the true social costs of their production. Taxes can be used to modify the prices
confronting the firms so that the socially desirable decisions are taken.
The problem has been exhaustively investigated in static settings where
there is no room for strategic interaction between the Regulator and the firms.
Consider, however, the following situation: (a) The emission taxes have a dual
effect, they incite the firms to reduce production and to undertake investments
in abatement technology. This is typically the case when the emissions are
increasing in the output and decreasing in the abatement technology; (b)
Emission reduction is socially desirable, the reduction of production is not; and
(c) The investments are irreversible. In that case, the Regulator must find an
optimal compromise between implementing high taxes to motivate high
investments, and keeping the taxes low to encourage production. The fact that
the investments are irreversible introduces a strategic element in the problem. If
the firms are naive and believe his announcements, the Regulator can insure
high production and important investments by first declaring high taxes and
reducing them once the corresponding investments have been realized. More
sophisticated firms, however, recognize that the initially high taxes will not be
implemented, and are reluctant to invest in the first place. In other words, one is
confronted with a typical time inconsistency problem, which has been
extensively treated in the monetary policy literature following Kydland and
Prescott (1977)) and Barro and Gordon (1983)). In environmental economics, the
time inconsistency problem has received yet only limited attention, although it
frequently occurs. See among others Gersbach and Glazer (1999)) for a number
of examples and for an interesting model, Abrego and Perroni (1999)), Batabyal
(1996a)), Batabyal (1996b)), Dijkstra (2002)), Marsiliani and Renstr}om (2000)),
Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003)).
The time inconsistency is directly related to the fact that the situation
described above defines a Stackelberg game between the Regulator (the leader)
and the firms (the followers). As noted in the seminal work of Simaan and Cruz
(1973a,b), inconsistency arises because the Stackelberg equilibrium is not
defined by mutual best responses. It implies that the follower uses a best
response in reaction the leader's action, but not that the leader's action is itself a
best response to the follower's. This opens the door to a re-optimization by the
leader once the follower has played. Thus, a Regulator who announces that he
will implement the Stackelberg solution is not credible.
An  usual  conclusion  is  that,  in  the   absence of   additional  mechanisms,
the  economy   is   doomed    to   converge   towards   the   less   desirable   Nash
2other agents. Thus, they take their decisions on the basis of prices that
do not re°ect the true social costs of their production. Taxes can be used
to modify the prices confronting the ¯rms so that the socially desirable
decisions are taken.
The problem has been exhaustively investigated in static settings where
there is no room for strategic interaction between the Regulator and the
¯rms. Consider, however, the following situation: (a) The emission taxes
have a dual e®ect, they incite the ¯rms to reduce production and to under-
take investments in abatement technology. This is typically the case when
the emissions are increasing in the output and decreasing in the abatement
technology; (b) Emission reduction is socially desirable, the reduction of
production is not; and (c) The investments are irreversible. In that case,
the Regulator must ¯nd an optimal compromise between implementing high
taxes to motivate high investments, and keeping the taxes low to encour-
age production. The fact that the investments are irreversible introduces
a strategic element in the problem. If the ¯rms are naive and believe his
announcements, the Regulator can insure high production and important
investments by ¯rst declaring high taxes and reducing them once the corre-
sponding investments have been realized. More sophisticated ¯rms, however,
recognize that the initially high taxes will not be implemented, and are re-
luctant to invest in the ¯rst place. In other words, one is confronted with
a typical time inconsistency problem, which has been extensively treated
in the monetary policy literature following Kydland and Prescott (1977))
and Barro and Gordon (1983)). In environmental economics, the time in-
consistency problem has received yet only limited attention, although it
frequently occurs. See among others Gersbach and Glazer (1999)) for a num-
ber of examples and for an interesting model, Abrego and Perroni (1999)),
Batabyal (1996a)), Batabyal (1996b)), Dijkstra (2002)), Marsiliani and Ren-
str} om (2000)), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003)).
The time inconsistency is directly related to the fact that the situa-
tion described above de¯nes a Stackelberg game between the Regulator (the
leader) and the ¯rms (the followers). As noted in the seminal work of Simaan
and Cruz (1973a,b), inconsistency arises because the Stackelberg equilibrium
is not de¯ned by mutual best responses. It implies that the follower uses
a best response in reaction the leader's action, but not that the leader's
action is itself a best response to the follower's. This opens the door to a
re-optimization by the leader once the follower has played. Thus, a Regu-
lator who announces that he will implement the Stackelberg solution is not
credible. An usual conclusion is that, in the absence of additional mecha-
nisms, the economy is doomed to converge towards the less desirable Nash
3solution.
A number of options to insure credible solutions have been considered
in the literature { credible binding commitments by the Stackelberg leader,
reputation building, use of trigger strategies by the followers, etc. See Mc-
Callum (1997)) for a review in a monetary policy context. Schematically,
these solutions aim at assuring the time consistency of Stackelberg solution
with either the Regulator or the ¯rms as a leader.Usually, these solutions
are not e±cient and can be Pareto-improved.
In this paper, we suggest a new solution to the time inconsistency prob-
lem in environmental policy. We show that non-binding tax announcements
can increase the payo® not only of the Regulator, but also of all ¯rms, if
these include any number of naive Believers who take the announcements
at face value. Moreover, if ¯rms tend to adopt the behavior of the most
successful ones, a stable equilibrium may exist where a positive fraction of
¯rms are Believers. This equilibrium Pareto-dominates the one where all
¯rms anticipate perfectly the Regulator's action. To attain the superior
equilibrium, the Regulator builds reputation and leadership by making an-
nouncements and implementing taxes in a way that generates good results
for the Believers, rather than by pre-committing to his announcements.
This Pareto-superior equilibrium does not always exist. Depending upon
the model parameters (most crucially: upon the speed with which the ¯rms
that follow di®erent strategies react to di®erences in their respective pro¯ts,
i.e., upon the °exibility of the ¯rms) it may be rational for the Regulator
to steer the Pareto-inferior fully rational equilibrium. This paper, thus,
stresses the importance of the °exibility in explaining the policies followed
by a Regulator, the welfare level realized, and the persistence or decay of
private con¯dence in the Regulator's announcements.
The potential usefulness of employing misleading announcements to Pareto-
improve upon standard game-theoretic equilibrium solutions was suggested
for the case of general linear-quadratic dynamic games in Vall¶ ee et al. (1999))
and developed by the same authors in subsequent papers. An early appli-
cation to environmental economics is Vall¶ ee (1998)). The Believers/Non-
Believers dichotomy was introduced in Deissenberg and Alvarez Gonzalez
(2002)), who study the credibility problem in monetary economics in a
discrete-time framework with reinforcement learning. A similar monetary
policy problem has been investigated in Dawid and Deissenberg (2004)) in
a continuous-time setting akin to the one used in the present work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of
environmental taxation, introduce the imitation-type dynamics that deter-
mine the evolution of the number of Believers in the economy, and derive
4the optimal reaction functions of the ¯rms. In Section 3, we discuss the so-
lution of the static problem one obtains by assuming a constant proportion
of Believers. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the dynamic problem
and to the presentation of the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an economy consisting of a Regulator R and of a continuum
of atomistic, pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms i with identical production technology.
Time ¿ is continuous. To keep notation simple, we do not index the variables
with either i or ¿; unless useful for a better understanding.
In a nutshell, the situation we consider is the following. The Regulator
can tax the ¯rms in order to incite them to reduce their emissions. Taxes,
however, have a negative impact on the employment. Thus, R has to choose
them in order to achieve an optimal compromise between emissions reduction
and employment. The following sequence of events occurs in every ¿:
² R makes a non-binding announcement ta ¸ 0 about the tax level he
will implement. The tax level is de¯ned as the amount each ¯rm has
to pay per unit of its emissions.
² Given ta; the ¯rms form expectations te about the actual level of the
environmental tax. As will be described in more detail later, there
are two di®erent ways for an individual ¯rm to form its expectations.
Each ¯rm i decides about its level of emission reduction vi based on
its expectation te
i and makes the necessary investments.
² R chooses the actual level of tax t ¸ 0.
² Each ¯rm i produces a quantity xi generating emissions xi ¡ vi.
² The individual ¯rms revise the way they form their expectations (that
is, revise their beliefs) depending on the pro¯ts they have realized.
The Firms
Each ¯rm produces the same homogenous good using a linear production
technology: The production of x units of output requires x units of labor and
generates x units of environmentally damaging emissions. The production
costs are given by:
5c(x) = wx + cxx2; (1)
where x is the output, w > 0 the ¯xed wage rate, and cx > 0 a parameter.
For simplicity's sake, the demand is assumed in¯nitely elastic at the given
price ~ p > w: Let p := ~ p ¡ w > 0:
At each point of time, each ¯rm can spend an additional amount of
money ° in order to reduce its current emissions. The investment
°(v) = cvv2; (2)
with cv > 0 a given parameter, is needed in order to reduce the ¯rm's current
emissions by v 2 [0;x]. The investment in one period has no impact on the
emissions in future periods. Rather than expenditures in emission-reducing
capital, ° can therefore be interpreted as the additional costs resulting of
a temporary switch to a cleaner resource { say, of a switch from coal to
natural gas.
Depending on the way they form their expectations te; we consider two
types of ¯rms, Believers B and Non-Believers NB: The fraction of Believers
in the population is denoted by ¼ 2 [0;1]. Believers consider the Regulator's
announcement to be truthful and set te = ta. Non-Believers disregard the
announcement and anticipate perfectly the actual tax level, te = t: Making
perfect anticipations at any point of time, however, is costly. Thus, Non-
Believers occur costs of ± > 0 per unit of time.
The ¯rms are pro¯t-maximizers. As will become apparent in the follow-
ing, one can assume without loss of substance that they are myopic, that is,
maximize in every ¿ their current pro¯t:
The Regulator R
The Regulator's goal is to maximize over an in¯nite horizon the cumu-
lated discounted value of an objective function with the employment, the
emissions, and the tax revenue as arguments. In order to realize this ob-
jective, it has two instruments at his disposal, the announced instantaneous
tax level ta; and the actually realized level t:










k(¼xb + (1 ¡ ¼)xnb) ¡ ·(¼(xb ¡ vb)
+(1 ¡ ¼)(xnb ¡ vnb)) + t(¼(xb ¡ vb) + (1 ¡ ¼)(xnb ¡ vnb))
i
d¿;
where xb;xnb;vb;vnb denote the optimal production respectively investment
chosen by the Believers B and the Non-Believers NB, and where k and · are
strictly positive weights placed by R on the average employment respectively
on the average emissions (remember that output and employment are in a
one-to-one relationship in this economy). The strictly positive parameter ½
is a social discount factor.
Belief Dynamics
The ¯rms' beliefs (B or NB) change according to a imitation-type dy-
namics, see Dawid (1999)), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)). The ¯rms meet
randomly two-by-two, each pairing being equiprobable. At each encounter
the ¯rm with the lower current pro¯t adopts the belief of the other ¯rm with
a probability proportional to the current di®erence between the individual
pro¯ts. This gives rise to the dynamics:
_ ¼ = ¯¼(1 ¡ ¼)(gb ¡ gnb); (4)
where gb and gnb denote the pro¯ts of a Believer and of a Non-Believer:
gb = pxb ¡ cx(xb)2 ¡ t(xb ¡ vb) ¡ cv(vb)2;
gnb = pxnb ¡ cx(xnb)2 ¡ t(xnb ¡ vnb) ¡ cv(vnb)2 ¡ ±:
Notice that ¼(1 ¡ ¼) reaches its maximum for ¼ = 1
2 (the value of ¼ for
which the probability of encounter between ¯rms with di®erent pro¯ts is
maximized); and tends towards 0 for ¼ ! 0 and ¼ ! 1 (for extreme values
of ¼; almost all ¯rms have the same pro¯ts). The parameter ¯ ¸ 0; that
depends on the adoption probability of the other's strategy may be inter-
preted as a measure of the willingness to change strategies, that is, of the
°exibility of the ¯rms.
Equation (4) implies that by choosing the value of (ta;t) at time ¿; the
Regulator not only in°uences its instantaneous objective but also the future
7proportion of Bs in the economy. This, in turn, has an impact on the values
of its objective function. Hence, although there are no explicit dynamics
for the economic variables v and x, the R faces a non-trivial inter-temporal
optimization problem.
Optimal Decisions of the Firms
Since the ¯rms are atomistic, each single producer is too small to in°u-
ence the dynamics of ¼. Thus, the single ¯rm does not take into account any
inter-temporal e®ect and, independently of its true planing horizon, de facto
maximizes its current pro¯t in every ¿. Each ¯rm chooses its investment v
after it has learned ta but before t has been made public. However, it ¯xes
its production level x after v and t are known. The ¯rms being price takers,





The thus de¯ned optimal x does not depend upon ta, neither directly nor
indirectly. As a consequence, both Bs and NBs choose the same production
level (5) as a function of the realized tax t alone, xb = xnb = x.





When the ¯rms determine their investment v, the actual tax rate is not




with te = t if the ¯rm is a NB and te = ta if the ¯rm is a B: The interior








The net emissions x ¡ v of any ¯rm will remain non-negative after the





8Given above expressions (5) for x and (6) for v; it is straightforward to
see that the belief dynamics can be written as:







The two e®ects that govern the evolution of ¼ become now apparent. Large
deviations of the realized tax level t from ta induce a decrease in the stock of
believers, whereas the stock of believers tends to grow if the cost ± necessary
to form rational expectations is high.
Using (5) and (6), the instantaneous objective function Á of the Regula-
tor becomes:






(¼ta + (1 ¡ ¼)t): (9)
3 The static problem
In the model, there is only one source of dynamics, the beliefs updating
(4). Before investigating the dynamic problem, it is instructive to cursorily
consider the solution $ of the static case in which R maximizes the integrand
in (3) for a given value of ¼:
From (9), one recognizes easily that at the optimum ta will either take
its highest possible value or be zero, depending on wether · ¡ t$ is positive
or negative. The case · ¡ t$ < 0 corresponds to the uninteresting situation
where the regulator values tax income more than emissions reduction and
thus tries to increase the volume of emissions. We therefore restrict our
analysis to the environmentally friendly case t$ < ·. Note that (7) provides





Assuming that the optimal takes the upper value ¹ ta just de¯ned (the choice





(· + ¹ ta ¡
cvk
cv + cx ¡ cx¼
): (11)
Note that t$ is decreasing in ¼: (As ¼ increases, the announcement ta be-
comes a more powerful instrument, making a recourse to t less necessary).
The requirement · > t$ is ful¯lled for all ¼ i®:
9cv(k + · ¡ p) + cx· > 0: (12)
In the reminder of this paper, we assume that (12) holds.
Turning to the ¯rms pro¯ts, one recognizes the di®erence gnb¡gb between
the NB0s and B0s pro¯ts is increasing in jt$ ¡ ta$j:




For ± = 0; the pro¯t of the NBs is always higher that the pro¯t of the Bs
whenever ta 6= t; re°ecting the fact the latter make a systematic error about
the true value of t: The pro¯t of the Bs, however, can exceed the one of
the NBs if the learning cost ± is high enough. Since ta$ is constant and t$
decreasing in ¼; and since t$ < ta$, the di®erence ta$ ¡ t$ increases in ¼.
Therefore, the di®erence between the pro¯ts of the NBs and Bs, (13); is
increasing in ¼.
Further analytical insights are exceedingly cumbersome to present due
to the complexity of the functions involved. We therefore illustrate a re-
markable, generic feature of the solution with the help of Figure 11. Not
only the Regulator's utility Á increases with ¼; so do also the pro¯ts of the
Bs and NBs. For ¼ = 0; the outcome is the Nash solution of a game be-
tween the NBs and the Regulator. This outcome is not e±cient, leaving
room for Pareto-improvement. As ¼ increases, the Bs enjoy the bene¯ts of
a decreasing t, while their investment remains ¯xed at v(¹ ta). Likewise, the
NBs bene¯t from the decrease in taxation. The lowering of the taxation is
made rational by the existence of the Believers, who are led by the R's an-
nouncements to invest more than they would otherwise, and to subsequently
emit less. Accordingly, the marginal tax income goes down as ¼ increases
and therefore R is induced to reduce taxation if the proportion of believers
goes up.
The only motive that could lead R to reduce the spread between t and ta;
and in particular to choose ta < ¹ ta; lies in the impact of the tax announce-
ments on the beliefs dynamics. Ceteris paribus, R prefers a high proportion
of Bs to a low one, since it has one more instrument (that is, ta) to in°uence
the Bs than to control the NBs. A high spread ta¡t; however, implies that
the pro¯ts of the Bs will be low compared to those of the NBs. This, by
(4), reduces the value of _ ¼ and leads over time to a lower proportion of Bs,
1The parameter values underlying the ¯gure are cv = 5; cx = 3; ± = 0; p = 6; k =
4; · = 3: The ¯gure is qualitatively robust with respect to changes in these values.
10diminishing the instantaneous utility of R: Therefore, in the dynamic prob-
lem, R will have to ¯nd an optimal compromise between choosing a high
value of ta;which allows a low value of t and insures the Regulator a high
instantaneous utility, and choosing a lower one, leading to a more favorable
proportion of Bs in the future.









Figure 1: Pro¯ts of the believers (solid line), of the non-believers (dashed
line), and Regulator's utility (bold-line) as a function of ¼.
4 Dynamic Analysis
4.1 Characterization of the optimal paths
As pointed out earlier, the Regulator faces a dynamic optimization problem
because of the e®ect of his current action on the future stock of believers.
This problem is given by:
max
0·ta(¿);t(¿)
©(ta;t) subject to (8):
The Hamiltonian of the problem is given by:
H(ta;t;¼;¸)












(ta ¡ t)2 + ±
¶
;
11where ¸ denotes the co-state variable. The Hamiltonian is concave in (t;ta)
i®:
2¸¯(1 ¡ ¼)(cv + cx) ¡ ¼cx > 0: (14)
The optimal controls ¤ are then given by:
t¤(¼;¸) =
¸¯(1 ¡ ¼)(cv(^ p ¡ k + ·) + cx·) ¡ cx·¼




2¸¯(1 ¡ ¼)(cv + cx) ¡ cx¼
£
cx·(1 ¡ ¼) (16)
+¸¯(1 ¡ ¼)(cv(^ p ¡ k + ·) + cx·) ¡ cv(^ p ¡ k ¡ ·)
¤
Otherwise, there are no interior optimal controls. In what follows we assume
that (14) is satis¯ed along the optimal path. It can be easily checked that
this is the case at the equilibrium discussed below.
The di®erence between the optimal announced and realized tax levels is
given by:




Hence the optimal announced tax exceeds the realized one if and only if
t¤ < ·. As in the static case, we restrict the analysis to the environmentally
friendly case t¤ < · and assume that (12) holds.
According to Pontriagins' Maximum Principle, an optimal solution (¼(¿);¸(¿))
has to satisfy the state dynamics (8) plus:





¿!1e¡½¿¸(¿) = 0: (19)
In our case the co-state dynamics are given by:
_ ¸ = ½¸ ¡
· ¡ t
2cv





(ta ¡ t)2 + ±)
¶
: (20)
In order to analyze the long run behavior of the system we now pro-
vide a characterization of the steady states for di®erent values of the public
°exibility parameter ¯. Due to the structure of the state dynamics there
are always trivial steady states for ¼ = 0 and ¼ = 1. For ¼ = 0 the an-
nouncement is irrelevant. Its optimal value is therefore indeterminate. The
optimal tax level is t = ·. For ¼ = 1; the concavity condition (14) is violated
12and the optimal controls are like in the static case. In the following, we re-
strict our attention to ¼ < 1. In Proposition 1, we ¯rst show under which
conditions there exists an interior steady state where Believers coexist with
Non-Believers. Furthermore, we discuss the stability of the steady states.
Proposition 1 Steady states and their stability:
(i) For 0 < ¯ ·
½
2± there exists no interior steady state. The steady state
at ¼ = 0 is stable.
(ii) For ¯ >
½
2± there exists a unique stable interior steady state ¼+ with:




The steady state at ¼ = 0 is unstable.
Proof: We prove the existence and the stability of the interior steady state.
The claims about the boundary steady state at ¼ = 0 follow directly.
Equation (8) implies that, in order for _ ¼ = 0; to hold one must have:
(ta¤ ¡ t¤)2 = 4cv±: (22)
That is, taking into account (17):
t¤ = · ¡ 2¸+¯(1 ¡ ¼+)
p
cv±: (23)




(ta¤ ¡ t¤) = 0: (24)
Using (17) for ta¤ ¡ t¤ in (24) we obtain the condition:
t¤ = · ¡
p
2½¯(1 ¡ ¼+)cv: (25)






must hold at an interior steady state. This condition is equivalent to (21).
For ¯ ·
½
2±; (21) becomes smaller or equal zero. Therefore, an interior steady
state is only possible for ¯ >
½
2±.












To determine the stability of the interior steady state we investigate the
Jacobian matrix J of the canonical system (8, 20) at the steady state. The







Therefore, the steady state is saddle point stable if and only if the determi-
nant of J is negative. Inserting (15, 16) into the canonical system (8, 20),
taking the derivatives with respect to (¼;¸) and then inserting (21, 26) gives










where C is a positive constant. The ¯rst of the two terms in the bracket
is negative due to the assumption (12), the second is negative whenever
¯ >
½
2±. Hence, det(J) < 0 whenever an interior steady state exists, imply-
ing that the interior steady state is always stable. For ¯ =
½
2± this stable
steady state collides with the unstable one at ¼ = 0: The steady state at
¼ = 0 therefore becomes stable for ¯ ·
½
2±. 2
Since there is always only one stable steady state and since cycles are im-
possible in a control problem with a one-dimensional state, we can conclude
from Proposition 1 that the stable steady state is always a global attractor.
Convergence to the unique steady state is always monotone. The long run
fraction of believers in the population is independent from the original level
of trust. From (21) one recognizes that it decreases with ½: An impatient
Regulator will not attempt to build up a large proportion of Bs since the
time and e®orts needed now for an additional increase of ¼ weighs heavily
compared to the future bene¯ts. By contrast, ¼+ is increasing in ¯ and ±:
A high °exibility ¯ of the ¯rms means that the cumulated loss of potential
utility occurred by the Regulator en route to ¼+ will be small and easily
compensated by the gains in the vicinity of and at ¼+: Reinforcing this, the
Regulator does not have to make Bs much better o® than NBs in order to
insure a fast reaction. As a result, for ¯ large, the equilibrium ¼+ is char-
acterized by a large proportion of Bs and provide high pro¯ts respectively
14utility to all players. A high learning cost ± means that the Regulator can
make the Bs better o® than the NBs at low or no cost, implying again a
high value of ¼ at the steady state:
Note that it is never optimal for the Regulator to follow a policy that
would ultimately insure that all ¯rms are Believers, ¼+ = 1: There are two
concurrent reasons for that. On the one hand, as ¼ increases, the Regulator
has to deviate more and more from the statically optimal solution ta$(¼);
t$(¼) to make believing more pro¯table than non-believing. On the other
hand, the beliefs dynamics slow down. Thus, the discounted bene¯ts from
increasing ¼ decrease.
For ½ = 0:8; cv = 5; cx = 3; ± = 0:15; p = 6; k = 4; · = 3 e.g.,
the pro¯ts and utility at the steady state ¼+ = 0:733333 are gb = gnb =
1:43785; Á = 2:33043: This steady state Pareto-dominates the fully rational
equilibrium with ¼ = 0, where gnb = 1:32708; Á = 2:30844: It also domi-
nates the equilibrium attained when the belief dynamics (8) holds but the
Regulator maximizes in each period his instantaneous utility Á instead of ©.
At this last equilibrium, ¼ = 0:21036; gb = gnb = 1:375; Á = 2:23689: Note
that the last two equilibria cannot be compared, since the latter provides a
higher pro¯t to the ¯rms but a lower utility to the Regulator.
This ranking of equilibria is robust with respect to parameter varia-
tions. A clear message emerges. As we contended at the beginning of this
paper the suggested solution Pareto-improves on the static Nash equilib-
rium. This solution implies both a beliefs dynamics among the ¯rms and
a farsighted Regulator. A farsighted Regulator without beliefs dynamics is
pointless. Beliefs dynamics with a myopic Regulator lead to a more mod-
est Pareto-improvement. But it is the combination of beliefs dynamics and
farsightedness that Pareto-dominates all other solutions.
4.2 The In°uence of Public Flexibility
An interesting question is whether the Regulator would prefer a population
that reacts quickly to pro¯t di®erences, shifting from Believing to Non-
Believing or vice versa in a short time, or if it would prefer a less reactive
population. In other words, would the Regulator prefer a high or a low value
of ¯?









A minimum level ¯ >
½
2± of °exibility is necessary for the system to converge
15towards an interior steady state with a positive fraction of Bs. For ¯ greater
than
½
2±, the fraction of Bs at the steady state increases with ¯, converging
towards ¼ = 1 as ¯ goes to in¯nity. One might think that, since the Regu-
lator always prefers a high proportion of Bs at equilibrium, he would also
prefer a high value of ¯. Stated in a more formal manner, one might expect
that the value function of the Regulator, V R(¼0); increases with ¯ regardless
of ¼0. This, however, is not the case. The dependence of V R(¼0) on ¯ is
non-monotone and depends crucially on ¼0. An analytical characterization
of V R(¼0) being impossible, we use a numerical example to illustrate that
point. The results are very robust with respect to parameter variations.
Figure 2 shows the steady state value ¼+ = ¼+ (¯) of ¼ for ¯ 2 [1;30]:
Figure 3 compares2 V R(0:2) and V R(0:8) for the same values of ¯. The
other parameter values are as before ½ = 0:8; cv = 5; cx = 3; ± = 0:15; p =







0 5 10 15 20 25 30
¼¤
¯
Figure 2: The proportion believers at the steady state for ¯ 2 [1;30].
Figure 3 reveals that one always has V R(0:8) > V R(0:2), re°ecting the
2The numerical calculations underlying this ¯gure were carried out using a powerful
proprietary computer program for the treatment of optimal control problems graciously
provided by Lars GrÄ une, whose support is most gratefully acknowledged. See GrÄ une and
Semmler (2002)).
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Figure 3: The value function of the Regulator for ¼ = 0:2 (dotted line) and
¼ = 0:8 (solid line) for ¯ 2 [1;30].
general result that V R(¼0) is increasing in ¼0 for any ¯. Both value functions
are not monotone in ¯ but U-shaped. Combining Figure 2 and Figure 3
shows that the minimum of V R(¼0) is always attained for the value of ¯
at which the steady state value ¼+ (¯) coincides with the initial fraction of
Believers ¼0. This result is quite intuitive. If ¼+ (¯) < ¼0; it is optimal for
the Regulator to reduce ¼ over time. The Regulator does it by announcing
a tax ta much greater than the tax t he will implement, making the Bs
worse o® than the NBs, but also increasing his own instantaneous bene¯ts
Á. Thus, R prefers that the convergence towards the steady state be as slow
as possible. That is, V R is decreasing in ¯. On the other hand, if ¼+ > ¼0,
it is optimal for R to increase ¼ over time. To do so, he must follow a
policy that makes the Bs better o® than the NBs, but thois is costly in
terms of his instantaneous objective function Á. It is therefore better for
R if the ¯rms react fast to the pro¯t di®erence. The value function V R
increases with ¯. Summarizing, the Regulator prefers (depending on ¼0) to
be confronted with either very °exible or very in°exible ¯rms. In-between
values of ¯ provide him smaller discounted bene¯t streams.
Whether a low or a high °exibility is preferable for R depends on the
17initial fraction ¼0 of Believers. Our numerical analysis suggests that a Reg-
ulator facing a small ¼0 prefer large values of ¯, whereas he prefers a low
value of ¯ when ¼0 is large. This result may follow from the speci¯c func-
tional form used in the model rather than re°ect any fundamental property
of the solution.
If ¯ = 0; the proportion of Bs remains ¯xed over time at ¼0 { any
initial value of ¼0 2 (0;1) corresponds to a stable equilibrium. The Pareto-
improving character of the inner equilibrium then disappears: Given ¯ = 0,
condition (14) is violated. The Regulator can announce any tax level without
having to fear negative long term consequences. Thus, it is in his interest to
exploit the gullibility of the Bs to the maximum. To obtain a meaningful,
Pareto-improving solution, some °exibility is necessary that assures that the
¯rms are not kept captive of beliefs that penalize them. Only then will the
Regulator be led to take into account the Bs interest:
5 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper is a situation frequently encountered in en-
vironmental economics (and similarly in other economic contexts as well):
If all ¯rms are perfectly rational Non-Believers who make perfect predic-
tions of the Regulator's actions and discard the Regulators announcements
as cheap talk, standard optimizing behavior leads to a Pareto-inferior out-
come, although there are no con°icts of interest between the di®erent ¯rms
and although the objectives of the ¯rms and of the Regulator largely concur.
We show that, in a static world, the existence of a positive fraction of Believ-
ers who take the Regulator's announcement at face value Pareto-improves
the economic outcome. This property crucially hinges on the fact that the
¯rms are atomistic and thus do not anticipate the collective impact of their
individual decisions.
The static model is extended by assuming that the proportion of Be-
lievers and Non-Believers changes over time depending on the di®erence in
the pro¯ts made by the two types of ¯rms. The Regulator is assumed to
recognize his ability to in°uence the evolution of the proportion of Believ-
ers by his choice of announced and realized taxes, and to be interested not
only in his instantaneous but also in his future utility. It is shown that a
rational Regulator will never steer the economy towards a Pareto-optimal
equilibrium. However, his optimal policy may lead to a stable steady state
with a strictly positive proportion of Believers that is Pareto-superior to
the equilibrium where all agents perfectly anticipate his actions. Prereq-
18uisites therefore are a su±ciently patient Regulator and ¯rms that occur
su±ciently high costs for building perfect anticipations of the government
actions and/or are suitably °exible, i.e., switch adequately fast between Be-
lieving and Non-Believing. The conjunction of beliefs dynamics for the ¯rms
and of a farsighted Regulator allows for a larger Pareto-improvement than
either only beliefs dynamics or only farsightedness. Depending upon the ini-
tial proportion of Believers, the Regulator is better o® if the ¯rms are very
°exible or very in°exible. Intermediate values of the °exibility parameter
are never optimal for the Regulator.
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